Boeing has just delayed test flights of its new 787 Dreamliner, and we should pay attention to what's going on, so we can tell our grandchildren: like NASA's space shuttle, this aircraft is the last of its breed.
The 787 has at least three determinants of extinction written into its DNA:
First, its design. The 787 is the most complex airplane ever conceived, which defies even the most basic paradigm of design science: solutions should get simpler over time, not more complicated. Creating a new flying machine isn't the same as, say, improving the reliability of a coffeemaker, or even finding ways for car models to share platform parts. But the physics of flight haven't changed since the Universe was created, let alone the first 777 rolled off the assembly line. This new plane should do all the things it needs to do more effectively and efficiently, shouldn’t it?
Now, it probably will also do a lot of things that previous models didn't do, and this raises an intriguing question regarding the viability of manufacturing complex technology products. The space shuttle was outdated the minute the first one arrived at Cape Canaveral; of the many things it did, many could have been done better (and cheaper), combined thereupon, or delegated to handheld and/or ground-based operation. There's a math here that suggests
- The more things a device tries to accomplish means
- The more complicated it becomes, which
- Makes its creation take longer (from inception to delivery), and
- Heightens the risk said creation will be outdated and overly costly by the time it arrives (not to mention more prone to failures)
My prediction is that the 797 will do less than the 787, not more.
Second, its production. While qualifying as a manufacturing job rivaling the Tower of Babel in its complexity, Boeing chose to model its production after the Biblical story, and outsourced manufacturing to disparate locations around the world.
I know. It sounds insane, and probably only appeared sensible on some management consultant slides that reduced the distances between factories in Seattle and Outer Mongolia to nothing more than a VOIP chat. Making an airplane is a tough, exacting deal on a good day -- and in one place -- and the experience of trying to manage and then assemble pieces from all over the world has proven to be a major obstacle for Boeing (and why the plane is already behind schedule).
Think of what it'll do to maintenance. With more parts and systems relying on a greater variety of sources could mean that keeping the things flying will be a challenge. I'm all for a full-employment act for airline unions, but I wonder if the carriers are fully prepared for what that workload might entail. I'm sure Boeing is getting ready, because it senses a lot of profit in that work. The smart money would be on the 797 having fewer "moving parts," both literally and figuratively.
Thirdly, the marketplace. Let's face it, air travel as an activity has less promise than it ever had before. Whether environmental impact, cost, inconvenience, or the ready availability of alternate means of communication ("hello, avatar, meet mine"), the world isn't going to need passenger planes like it once did. Of course there will always be a need for them -- and lots of aging planes the need to get replaced -- but there are also a number of new options for those requirements: commuter jets.
The 787 represents the pinnacle of achievement for a big, highly complex, massively difficult maintenance approach to building technology gizmos.
I suspect it will never be topped.
